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INDIVIDUAL DISMISSALS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES:  






In this article, we present a model of individual dismissals based on the workers’ right to file a 
suit against their employer arguing that the dismissal is unjustified or unfair. The model is a 
standard pre-trial bargaining game between a firm and a worker. We study two cases: when the 
law states the severance pay for unfair dismissal (the European case), and when judges can 
decide freely on the compensation to be paid to the worker (the American case). The model 
provides some guidelines for Labour Law reforms. In the European case, a decrease in the 
severance pay for unfair dismissals fixed by law will decrease the severance pay offered by the 
firm, and only under some assumptions will decrease the expected firing cost and will increase 
the settlement probability. In addition, the transition from the European to the American case is 
likely to increase the probability of settlement (and to decrease it in the opposite case) with 
ambiguous effects on agreed severance pay and expected firing costs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 In this article, we provide a simple theoretical framework to understand the cost of 
individual dismissals
1 focusing on the importance of the workers’ right to file a suit against the 
firm. Our approach is explicitly based on a Law and Economics perspective and it complements 
in a fruitful way the current literature on firing costs (usually based on macroeconomic models). 
On one hand, the theoretical models of firing costs
2 are based on the assumption of ex-ante 
known dismissal costs, when a key aspect of individual dismissals is the uncertainty about the 
dismissal cost if the worker can file a suit against the firm. On the other hand, the empirical 
research on firing costs (Emerson, 1988; Grubb and Wells, 1993; Bertola et al., 1999) has 
stressed the importance of the enforcement of the employment security legislation beyond the 
minima and/or maxima stated by the law for severance pay. However, these empirical 
analyses only occasionally are presented in terms of a systematic Law and Economics 
reasoning. 
 We will focus on these issues considering explicitly the legal framework of individual 
dismissals. Therefore, we propose a standard pre-trial bargaining game which rests on the most 
common legal feature of individual dismissals, that is, the workers’ right to file a suit against 
their employer due to an unfair dismissal. Besides, while some countries impose some rules or 
formulae to the tribunal for the severance pay for unfair dismissals, others allow the courts to 
impose the compensation they consider suitable. 
Although the model is based on simplifying and restrictive assumptions, we provide a 
basic theoretical framework to compare the European system (where, usually, the law states 
some rules as minima and/or maxima to determine the severance pay, restricting severely the 
choices of the judges), and the US system (where judges have to evaluate in every case the   4 
damage suffered by the worker in order to determine the severance pay). We obtain some 
interesting and new results. First, in the European case a decrease in the severance pay for unfair 
dismissals will decrease the agreed severance pay, but only will decrease the expected firing 
costs (the most important variable for the firm) under some assumptions. Second, a change from 
the European to the American legal framework (and the opposite change too) has ambiguous 
effects on the expected firing costs. Third, a change from the American to the European case 
will decrease the settlement probability. The first and the second results are related to the debate 
on the usual recommendations to decrease firing costs in Europe. Our model does not support 
the simplistic recommendation on merely decreasing the severance pay for unfair dismissals or 
‘imitating’ the American legal framework. The third result is related to the US debate about the 
increase in dismissals litigation. Our model predicts that a change from an American framework 
to a European one will decrease the settlement probability with ambiguous effects on severance 
pay and expected firing costs.  
 The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the main aspects of the 
European and American legal framework on unfair dismissals. In section 3, we present the main 
model and we obtain an expression for the expected firing costs and the settlement probability. 
This model includes a severance pay for unfair dismissal stated exogenously by law. Section 4 
develops a version of the model where the courts can decide the amount of compensation when 
dismissal is declared as unfair. In Section 5, we compare both versions of the model discussing 
the implications in terms of the usual recommendation on changing Labour Law in Europe and 
the US. Finally, we summarise the main conclusions of the article including some proposals for 
future research. 
 
2. The individual dismissals litigation in Europe and in the United States 
   5 
 
The legal rules governing individual dismissals are one of the most important parts of 
the Labour Law of any country. Although there are substantial differences on specific 
requirements, advice, etc., we can “extract” some key common aspects. A basic characteristic 
of dismissals regulation of any democratic country is the workers’ right to file a suit against 
their employer questioning their dismissal as unfair or unjustified. Even the ILO Convention 
158 of 1982 specifies that all workers with a permanent contract should be given a valid 
reason for their dismissal. Obviously, this Convention is related to the right to file a suit when 
the dismissed worker considers that the reason is not valid or unfair. Additionally, it creates a 
space to some sort of remedies against an unfair dismissal. Only a few countries have 
explicitly adopted this Convention, but the Labour Law of the European countries assumes in 
different forms the aim of the ILO Convention. Therefore, we interpret that the workers’ right 
to file a suit against his/her employer for unfair dismissal is a typical characteristic of the 
European employment regulations. Of course, there are different national regimes for this 
right. For example, in the United Kingdom, the unfair dismissal legislation extends the 
protection offered by the Common Law only when the worker fulfils some requirements 
(Deakin and Wilkinson, 1999). In the continental countries, the right of the workers to file a 
suit is usually wider. For example, the opposite case to the United Kingdom is Spain, where 
any worker with a permanent contract enjoy this right. In an intermediate position we have, 
for example, the German case, where workers enjoy this right but those workers in firms with 
5 or less workers are less protected against dismissal (although notice periods are the same 
than in larger firms). 
When a dismissal is declared unfair in the tribunal, there are some remedies included in the 
different national laws, but the most common are two: reinstatement and financial   6 
compensation. Usually, the remedy most used is the financial compensation. As we can see in 
Table 1, in the European countries this financial compensation can not be imposed freely by 
the tribunal. There are limits (more or less severe) to the total financial burden to be assumed 
for the firm when the dismissal is declared as unfair. 
Usually, the literature on firing costs stresses that in the US there are no public 
regulations on dismissal costs, allowing the firms to dismiss at a low or no cost (as it is 
shown in Table 1). The classical employment-at-will doctrine allows the firm to dismiss 'for 
good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong' (Payne v. Western & Atlantic RR, 
quoted in Buechtemann, 1993; chap. 1).  In the 1970s and 1980s a growing number of state 
supreme courts recognised exceptions to the US traditional employment-at-will doctrine
3. 
The result has been a great surge in wrongful-discharge litigation cases, some of them 
involving huge compensatory awards (see Gould, 1986). Dertouzos et al. (1988) estimated 
that the total direct awards were, on average, $ 650,000 per successful plaintiff (based on the 
analysis of 120 jury verdicts in California in the period 1980-86). The increasing costs of 
wrongful termination litigation might explain the US trend toward an increase in mass 
layoffs, with a relatively lower cost per dismissed worker, as Oyer and Schaefer (2000) 
explain. These authors show that the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 has affected the 
methods of displacement used by American firms. The evidence supporting a change in 
patterns of adjustment indicates that the expected cost of wrongful-termination litigation is 
not negligible, but in terms of our model developed in following sections the possibility to 
file a suit by wrongful-termination in some states introduce severance payments fixed freely 
by the courts. In addition, the great variability of compensations imposed by courts have 
created a new situation in which the firms are damaged and some workers use improperly this 
legislation (Gould, 1986). Some authors, as Buechtemann (1993; chap. 1), believe that the   7 
solution to these unexpected effects to the employment-at-will exceptions consists of a 
dismissal legislation in the European way, and we will analyse this proposal in the simplified 
terms of our model. 
The legal requirements and the enforceability degree of the workers’ right to file a suit 
against his/her employer vary widely across Europe, but there is a great difference between 
the European and American legal frameworks: the freedom of judges to decide the financial 
compensation that the worker must receive when the dismissal is declared as unfair. As Table 
1 shows, in Europe there are different degrees of restrictions on the total amount of such 
financial compensation, whilst in the US the tribunal is totally free to decide the financial 
compensation (maybe because it is conceived as a case of compensation for damages, as in a 
civil case). This key difference will be used in our theoretical model presented in following 
sections to formalize our simplified European and American cases. We will analyse the 
effects of such difference on severance pay offered before going to the courts, on the 
settlement probability and on the expected firing costs for the firm. After the analysis of both 
cases, we will present how a movement from one legal framework to the other can affect to 
the three basic variables described before. As many labour market policy recommendations 
concerning firing costs are related to Labour Law reforms (from the American to the 
European case or the opposite), with this analysis we will try to provide a systematic 
reasoning about the effects that we can expect changing some aspects of the legal framework.  8 
Table 1. Rules governing compensations related to unfair dismissal in some European 
countries and in the United States 
Austria  There is a rigid formula to estimate the severance pay for unfair 
dismissal in terms of the length of service. 
Denmark  The compensation for unfair dismissal can not exceed an amount 
equal to the wage of 52 weeks. This amount is a maximum, and the 
Tribunal is free to determine a lower compensation considering all 
circumstances of the case. 
France  In the case of unjustified dismissal and when parties refuse 
reinstatement, the employer is obliged to pay to the employee a 
compensation not lower than the previous six months’ earnings. When 
formal requirements have not been fulfilled there is an additional 
compensation of one month’s wages (at most). 
Germany  The maximum sum payable in compensation for unfair dismissal is 12 
months’ pay in general, 15 for workers aged 50 and over with at least 
15 years of service and 18 for workers aged 55 and over with at least 
20 years of service. 
 
Ireland  In the case of unfair dismissal the Tribunal can impose a compensation 
to the employer up to 104 weeks’ pay when the employee’s financial 
loss is attributable to the dismissal, otherwise the compensation may 
not exceed 4 weeks’ pay. 
Italy  For unjustified dismissal the sanctions consist of reinstatement and 
compensation equal to at least 5 months pay. Besides the employee 
has the right to choose to compensate (15 monthly payments) rather 
than reinstate. 
Netherlands  There are no statutory requirement on severance pay nor legal 
provisions on penalties for unfair dismissals. However, severance 
payments may be awarded in the court as compensation for unfair 
dismissal following this formula (in general, although there are other 
formulae): (years of service) x (pay) x (correction factor). The 
formulae were created by the judges themselves. The average 
severance pay of these calculations is one month’s pay per year of 
service. 
Spain  For unfair dismissal there is a rigid formula to calculate severance pay: 
45 days’ wages per year of service, with a maximum of 42 months 
wages. In the new permanent contracts introduced in 1997, the 
severance pay for unfair dismissal (when the cause alleged by the firm 
was economic) is 33 days wages per year of service, with a maximum 
of 24 months wages. 
United States   Under the federal legislation employees are provided with specific 
remedies against unlawful dismissal, and among them it is the 
traditional remedies of damages 
Source: Annex C of Bertola et al. (1999). 
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3. The pre-trial bargaining of an individual dismissal with known severance 
pay 
 
As the legal framework gives to the worker the right to file a suit against his/her 
employer, the litigation could be agreed before going to the courts. There is a broad Economics 
and Law literature focusing on pre-trial bargaining. The seminal analyses on litigation and 
settlement were Landes (1971) and Gould (1973), although these authors did not build a formal 
model of the bargaining process. Pre-trial bargaining models -using Game Theory- have been 
offered, for instance, by P'ng (1983), Bebchuk (1984) and Spier (1992). Of course, these models 
exclude some aspects of real pre-trial bargaining, but they give a simple approach which can be 
used to highlight some real problems. Bebchuk (1984) provides the basis for the model 
developed here. 
 The starting point is the following: the firm is affected by a negative shock and decides 
to dismiss a worker. Then, the firm communicates him/her its decision. The firm knows that 
he/she could go to the courts alleging unfair dismissal. It is clear that it could be profitable for 
the two parties to bargain in the shadow of the law in order to reach an agreement before going 
to trial. Some countries provide specialized institutions for the pre-trial bargaining (the ACAS 
in the UK or the MAC offices in Spain, for instance
4). In case of disagreement, the courts will 
solve the individual dismissal imposing a severance pay if the dismissal is considered unfair. 
We do not consider reinstatement as an alternative (although reinstatement could be understood 
as a monetary cost and the results would be very similar). 
 The expected litigation costs are Cf for the firm and Cw for the worker. If the firm is 
found liable by the court, the worker will receive W as severance pay. This amount is fixed 
exogenously by law and the judge can not change it. The three quantities Cf, Cw and W are   10 
supposed common knowledge.  
In general, the intervention of the courts following a disagreement means a risky 
prospect for both parties, worker and firm, because the decision of the judge is not known ex 
ante. Let us call A and B the certainty equivalents, respectively for the worker and the firm of 
this risky prospect. That is to say, A is the minimal quantity that the worker would accept to be 
paid to reach an agreement avoiding the courts, and B is the maximal quantity that the firm 
would accept to pay to reach an agreement avoiding the courts. 
Of course, A is dependent on the parameters Cw and W, and B is dependent on the 


























A and B also depend of the degree of risk aversion exhibited by worker and firm, and of 
the perceived likelihood of the dismissal being declared as unfair. Let us also assume that the 
firm does not know A, but supposes it to be a random variable with Cumulative Distribution 
F(.) and density function f(.), with support in the interval [L ; H], where 0 < L < H < W - Cw. In 
general, F(.) will be the Uniform Distribution over [L ; H]. The quantities L and H, being the 
expression of the information of the firm about the value of A, are dependent on the parameters 
Cw and W, and also on the knowledge of the firm about the position with respect to the risk of 
the worker and about the perception by the worker of the likelihood of the dismissal being 
declared as unfair. Let us also make the following natural assumptions: 








































An interesting particular case (which will be called case 1) occurs when the firm has an 
estimate p of the probability of unfair dismissal declaration, the worker has an estimate equal to   11 
p’, both firm and worker are risk neutral, and the firm supposes that p’ is a random variable with 
Cumulative Distribution G(.) and density function g(.), with support in the interval [pL ; pH], 
where 0 < pL  < p < pH <1. In such a case,  A = p’ W  - Cw , B = p W + Cf  , L = pL W - Cw , H = 
pH W - Cw  and F(z) = G(p’ W - Cw). 
 The sequence of the offers differs from Bebchuk (1984) where the plaintiff (here, the 
worker) chooses a settlement amount and offers it to the defendant (here, the firm) on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis. Here, the firm makes the first movement in the bargaining when it 
communicates to the worker his/her dismissal and the reasons of this decision. Exactly in that 
moment the firm makes a settlement offer on a take-it-or-leave basis. Then, the worker has to 
decide whether to accept. If he/she accepts, the bargaining ends. If he/she rejects the offer, the 
case is solved in the courts. 
Now, in order to deduce the parties' behaviour, we must consider their decision 
problems. Let us denote the firm's offer as S. The worker, confronted to an ultimatum situation, 
will accept the settlement offer if and only if:   A  £  S . In words, the worker will accept if  the 
offer is higher than the certainty equivalent of going to the courts. Thus the firm knows that the 
worker will accept the offer S if and only if A (that is, the realization of the random variable) 
happens to be lower than S.  
 We now consider the firm's decision problem. If the firm makes the offer S, the worker 
will accept with probability F(S). In this case the firm only has to pay S. The probability of 
rejecting will be  1 – F(S). In the last case, the ex ante evaluated cost is B. Thus, the total 
expected cost to the firm when its offer is S will be: 
   EC(S) = S . F(S) + (1 - F(S)).B 
Therefore, the firm will try to solve the following minimization problem: 
 MinS   [S F(S) + (1 - F(S))B]   12 
3.1 Computation of optimal quantities. 









Computing and simplifying:   S f(S) + F(S)  - Bf(S) = 0  ; (B-S)f(S) - F(S)  = 0 
If we denote  S*, q* and EC*, respectively, the optimal offer, the optimal probability of 
agreement and the minimal expected cost for the firm, the equations determining these optimal 
quantities are: 
 (B-S*)f(S*) - F(S*)  = 0      (1) 
q*= F( S*)          (2) 
EC*  = EC(S*) = S*F(S*) + (1 - F(S*))B  (3) 
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S B  and we can obtain 
an explicit solution for the optimal offer (which can be considered as a sort of split-the-
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= < H, that is to say, if B < 2H – L. On the other hand, if  B ³ 2H – L, we would have 
a corner solution: 
     S*=H            (4Corner)    13 
 Replacing (4) in (2) and (3), and doing the corresponding computations, we also obtain 
the explicit interior solutions for the equilibrium probability q
* and the minimal expected firing 
cost EC* : 
q*= F( S*) =  
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 In a similar way, replacing (4Corner) in (2) and (3), we obtain the explicit corner solutions:  
q*= F(H) =  1              (5Corner) 
EC*  = S*F(S*) + (1 - F(S*))B  =    H       
  (6Corner) 
 The equilibrium expected payoff for the worker, in the case of an interior solution, 
would be: 

























+  (7) 
 And the corresponding corner solution would be: 
EP* = H               (7Corner) 
 
For the particular case 1, in which A = p’ W  - Cw , B = p W + Cf  , L = pL W - Cw and H = 
pH W - Cw , we have: 
Interior solutions:    
S*(Particular case 1) = 
2
C   -   C   +  
2
p   +   p
  W  
w f L     (8)   14 
q*(Particular case 1) =   
p - p W
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    (9) 
EC*(Particular case 1) =  ) 1 (
* * * q B q  S - +      (10) 
Corner solutions (occurring if  p W C     C p   +   p   W   H w f L 2 ) ( ³ + + ) :  
S*(Particular case 1) =  C   W p H w H - =      (8Corner) 
q*(Particular case 1) = 1        (9Corner) 
EC*(Particular case 1) =  C   W p H w H - =     (10Corner) 
 
3.2 Discussion on changes in the key parameters. 
In order to develop a useful comparative static analysis, we must ask what the main 
dependent variables and the key parameters of the problem are. From the point of view of the 
parties the main dependent variables are the equilibrium expected cost and payoff, EC* and 
EP*. However, from an aggregate or social point of view the main dependent variable would be 
q
*, the probability of settlement with the optimal offer S
*, because the resolution of litigations by 
agreement will save costs to both parties and will also contribute to a good climate in the 
industrial relations system. As for the key parameters, although  Cf and Cw could be altered on 
average to some extent by the legislator action, it seems clear that the key policy parameter is W, 
the severance pay for unfair dismissal exogenously determined by the law. Therefore, we will 
limit our analysis to the consequences on the final optimal outcomes S*, q*, EC* of a change in 
the parameter W. Let us compute the marginal effects of a change in W on the optimal 
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   (16) 
In conclusion, a (marginal) increase in the severance pay fixed by law (W) will cause 
always an increase in the optimal offer S
* and, for the particular case 1, would cause an increase 
in the expected firing cost ECf (S
*) and a decrease in the settlement probability (q*). Although 
our assumptions impose some limits to a direct application of the model to the real situations, 
we can interpret, in general terms, this case as the most common European legislation for 
individual dismissals. For the general case proposed in the model, a decrease in W will decrease   16 
 S*, but the effect on the expected firing costs to the firm will depend on the exact value of the 
parameters of the model. However, to the extent that the particular case 1 may be applicable, if a 
European government wants to reduce firing costs decreasing W, the firms will enjoy lower 
expected costs, the offers will be lower, and the settlement probability will increase (and, 
presumably, with fewer cases solved by the courts). 
 
4. The pre-trial bargaining with unknown severance pay 
 
In this section, we present a slightly modified version of the model developed before. As 
in section 2, the firm, affected by a negative shock, decides to dismiss a worker and 
communicates him/her its decision, but knows that he/she could go to the courts alleging unfair 
dismissal. Again, it is possible for the two parties to bargain in the shadow of the law in order to 
reach an agreement before going to trial. In case of disagreement, with expected litigation costs 
Cf  for the firm and Cw for the worker, the courts will solve the individual dismissal imposing a 
severance pay if the dismissal is considered unfair. However, now this severance pay is not 
fixed exogenously by law, but determined exclusively by the courts in each litigation. We 
associate this situation to the American case. The parties face uncertainty on the severance pay 
value and, at most, see this quantity as a random variable.  
The intervention of the courts following a disagreement is also in this context a risky 
prospect for both parties, worker and firm. In fact, we could say that the prospect is now riskier 
because the parties face a double judge’s decision not known ex ante: the decision of declaring 
the dismissal as fair or unfair, and the quantitative decision of fixing a severance pay amount not 
restricted to a known range. We will build the new model keeping the same notation used in 
section 3.    17 
Let us call A and B the certainty equivalents, respectively for the worker and the firm of 
this risky prospect of going to the courts. That is to say, A is the minimal quantity (respectively 
B is the maximal quantity) that the worker would accept to be paid (respectively the firm would 
accept to pay) to reach an agreement avoiding the courts.  
A is now dependent on the parameter Cw, on the perceived likelihood of the dismissal 
being declared as unfair, on the worker’s estimate (call it X) of the severance pay to be decided 
by the judge conditional on the dismissal being declared as unfair, and on the degree of risk 
aversion of the worker. In a similar way, B is now dependent on the parameter Cf, on the 
perceived likelihood of the dismissal being declared as unfair, on the firm’s estimate (call it Y) 
of the severance pay to be decided by the judge, and on the degree of risk aversion of the firm. 
Let us assume that the firm does not know A, but supposes it to be a random variable with 
Cumulative Distribution F(.) and density function f(.), with support in the interval [L ; H], where 
0 < L < H. As in section 3, F(.) will be the Uniform Distribution over [L ; H]. The quantities L 
and H, being the expression of the information of the firm about the value of A, are dependent 
on the parameter Cw and on the knowledge of the firm about the worker: his/her degree of risk 
aversion, his/her estimation of the likelihood of the dismissal being declared as unfair, and 
his/her estimation X of the severance pay.  
Let us also make the following natural assumptions:  
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 The sequence of the offers, as well as the way of reasoning, is the same as in section 3. If 
we call S the settlement  offer made by the firm, the worker will accept it if and only if   A  £  S . 
If the firm makes the offer S, the worker will accept with probability F(S), and in this case the 
firm only has to pay S. The worker will reject the offer with probability 1- F(S) and, in this last   18 
case, the ex ante evaluated cost by the firm is B. Therefore, the firm will try to solve the 
following minimization problem:  
MinS   EC(S)   
where EC(S) = S . F(S) + (1 - F(S)).B is the total expected cost to the firm when its offer is S. 
 
4.1 Computation of optimal quantities. 
This computation is exactly the same as in subsection 3.1. Therefore, the optimal quantities are: 






=             (18) 
q*  =  
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-           (20) 
- Corner solutions (valid if  B  > 2H – L): 
S* = H              (18Corner) 
q*  =  1            (19Corner) 
EC*  = H            (20Corner) 
 
4.2 Discussion on changes in the key parameters. 
Since the key parameter used in subsection 3.2, the severance pay W fixed by law, is absent in 
this case of unknown severance pay, we can not make now the same comparative static analysis 
(with immediate relevancy from the policy point of view) as in that subsection.  
Nevertheless, it may be interesting to ask what changes would produce on the optimal 
outcomes an institutional change (or, equivalently, a generalized change in the judges’ attitude   19 
with respect to the severance pay amount) decreasing the severance pay imposed on the unfair 
dismissals.  
This institutional change would cause a decrease in both estimates X and Y. Therefore, 


















=  ,  S* would also decrease. However, it is impossible 
to know if  q* and EC* would increase or decrease. Furthermore, since in this case of unknown 
severance pay it is difficult to assume a simple model like the particular case 1, we can not 
anticipate, even in an approximate way, the behaviour of q* and EC* following such an 
institutional change. 
Another institutional change which is interesting from the point of view of a 
comparative static analysis consists in reducing the uncertainty with respect to the quantity 
imposed as a severance pay for unfair dismissals. While the last considered institutional change 
caused a decrease in both X and Y, and consequently a decrease in L, H, A and B, this new 
change is likely to cause (through a decrease in the degree of risk aversion of the firm) a 














 are going to increase or decrease. In the next section, 
a more detailed analysis of this type of change will be made. 
 
5. Consequences of reforms of the legal framework 
 
The relevant question, which we will try to address, is now the following: What 
alteration suffers the probability of settlement as a consequence of moving from an unknown 
severance pay situation to a known severance pay one? 
Let us begin trying to make a simple comparative analysis for the case of a sudden   20 
institutional change moving in one step from a situation AC (for American case) with a 
completely unknown severance pay (expressed by a random variable w with known expected 
value but unknown distribution), to a situation EC (for European case) with a severance pay W, 
completely specified by law. For the intended comparative analysis to be meaningful, it is 
necessary to assume that there is no difference between the two situations, except the 
uncertainty about W. In particular, the perceptions of both parties about the expected severance 
pay when the dismissal will be declared as unfair, and the perceptions about the probability of 
unfair dismissal declaration, remain unaltered, and this implies that the expected value of w, 
E(w), equals W.  
Applying our model to the two situations, let us call  AAC , BAC , LAC and HAC the 
certainty equivalents and the uniform distribution interval extremes defined for the situation 
AC, and let us call AEC , BEC , LEC and HEC the corresponding values for the situation EC. We 
have the following equilibrium probabilities of agreement qAC* and qEC* : 
Situation AC (American case):  qAC*  = 







  (21) 
Situation  EC (European case) :  qEC*  = 






  (22) 
In order to compare  qAC* and qEC*, we need to make some assumptions about the 
relations between the quantities BAC, LAC and HAC, and the quantities  BEC , LEC and HEC . For 
the firm, although the expected severance pay is the same (E(w) = W), the prospect of going to 
the courts in the situation AC is clearly riskier, and more threatening, than that of the situation 
EC, because the firm does not know exactly the distribution of w and because may be afraid of 
the possibility of a very extreme value of w taking place. Thus, the following assumption is 
reasonable:   21 
       BAC > BEC         (23) 
For the worker, the prospect of going to the courts in the situation AC is also riskier than 
that of the situation E, but he does not see it as threatening as the firm does, because the possible 
extreme values of w are beneficial to him/her. Thus, our assumptions should allow even a 
moderate degree of risk proneness for the worker (which would imply an increase in the 
worker’s demand A) and also a moderate degradation in the precision of the firm’s conjecture 
about A (which would imply an increase in the length of the interval [LEC, HEC]). Thus, we 





= a  > 1 :  
LAC   <  a LEC           and       (HAC - LAC )  <  a (HEC - LEC)   (24) 
In words, because of their aversion to the new risk of the situation AC, the firm is ready 
to offer more, and the worker is ready to decrease his/her demand or to increase in a moderated 
way. 
Let us now compare  qEC* and qE* : 
qAC*   =  






  = 






























 = qEC*        (25) 
Therefore, a sudden change from the situation EC to the situation AC would cause an 
increase in the equilibrium probability of agreement, while a change in the opposite direction 
would decrease the settlement probability.  
We could also make a comparative analysis supposing marginal institutional changes 
moving from a given situation to a new situation in which the uncertainty about the severance 
pay has slightly decreased. The iteration of such minor changes would mean a move from an 
original American situation (with a completely unknown severance pay, a random variable w) to   22 
a final European situation (with a severance pay W, specified by law). For such an analysis, in 
which we resort, as in the above sections, to the usual tools of the differential calculus, we need 
a scalar parameter in which marginal increments make sense. 
Let us call K such a parameter, varying in the closed interval [0, 1] of real numbers. We 
can interpret K as a degree of knowledge about the severance pay, in such a way that an increase 
in K means a decrease in the uncertainty about the severance pay. In the minimal value K = 0 we 
have the American situation (nothing is known about that pay, except its expected value W), 
while in the maximal value K = 1 we have the European situation (the severance pay W is 
strictly specified by law). An intermediate value of K, say K = ¾, could be interpreted as a 
severance pay not exactly specified but restricted to belong to a known interval, say [W/2, 2W]. 
In this general context, we could say that, keeping for the parameters A, B, L and H the 
same meaning as above, it is obvious that these parameters are now dependent, not only on Cw, 
Cf, on the perceived likelihood of the dismissal being declared as unfair and on the position with 
respect to the risk of both parties, but also on the new parameter K. On the other hand, since the 
risk threat posed to the firm by the prospect of going to the courts decreases when K, let us 
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Thus a marginal change decreasing the uncertainty about the severance pay causes a 
decrease in the settlement probability. Since every marginal change of this type causes a 
decrease in that probability, the final (European) situation has a lower settlement probability 
than the original one. Therefore, within the limits of our assumptions, we could say that a legal 
reform from a US system (where judges are free to determine W) to a European system (where, 
usually, W is exogenously determined by law) will be related to a decrease in the settlement 
probability, and, presumably, leaving more conflicting cases to the courts. The intuitive 
explanation is that a higher uncertainty about the severance pay makes the firm (due especially 
to the its risk aversion) more interested in reaching an agreement with the worker. 
This result can be related to the discussion on the changes in firing costs. Usually, the 
higher firing costs in Europe respect to the US have been shown as a source of labour market 
rigidity and partially responsible of the poor performance of the European labour market in 
recent decades. The subsequent recommendation has been to change the European legal 
framework. In section 3, we saw that a decrease in W will decrease S*, but only will decrease   24 
the expected firing costs for the firm in the special case 1. But if the European legal 
framework is more deeply altered giving to the courts the possibility to decide freely on W, 
then the result is ambiguous respect to agreed severance pay and expected firing costs, but 
increasing the settlement probability. Therefore, changing the European firing costs 
legislation towards the American case will only decrease expected firing costs (the key 
variable for the firms more than severance pay itself) under some values of the parameters of 
the model. In the opposite way, the US debate about introducing legal changes towards a 
European legislation to limit the huge expansion in dismissals litigation is not supported by 
our model, because this change will decrease the settlement probability, increasing 





In this article, we have presented a theoretical model of individual dismissals as a pre-
trial bargaining game between the worker and the firm. This model is suitable because of the 
extent of the workers’ right to file a suit against the firm due to unfair dismissal. The legal 
framework tends to determine severance pay through an ex-post (in other words, after a negative 
shock) bargaining process between the firm and the worker, affecting to the ex-ante expected 
firing costs. Following the Law and Economics literature on pre-trial bargaining, this bargaining 
process has been formalized here as a take-it-or-leave-it offer from the firm, because this 
sequence of offers seems the simplest way to consider the key features of real situations. In case 
of disagreement, the courts will solve the individual dismissal imposing a severance pay if the 
dismissal is considered unfair. We do not consider reinstatement as an alternative (although 
reinstatement could be understood as a monetary cost and the results would be very similar).   25 
 The model is presented in two versions: first, the severance pay imposed in the courts is 
determined exogenously by the law; second, this severance pay is decided only by the judge. 
The first case has been associated to the European Labour Law, and the second case to the US 
legal framework. In the ‘European context’ the best way to decrease firing costs is decreasing 
the severance pay fixed by law, because this legal reform will decrease not only the costs of 
those unfair dismissals solved directly the courts but expected firing costs too (and with an 
increase in settlement probability), but only under certain restrictive assumptions. Otherwise a 
decrease in severance pay fixed by law will decrease agreed severance pay, but the effect on the 
expected firing costs will be ambiguous. 
We have analysed a change from one legal framework to the other, obtaining only non 
ambiguous results for the settlement probability. Therefore, the widely extended 
recommendations on changing the European Labour Law towards the American one as an 
adequate mean to decrease firing costs are not supported by our model. In particular, the effect 
on the settled severance pay and on total expected firing costs is ambiguous. The same is true 
for the American debate on introducing changes following the European legal framework in 
order to eliminate the problems created by the boom in unfair dismissal litigation, because in 
terms of our model this change will decrease the settlement probability. 
Finally, from our own point of view, this article opens the door to future research based 
on the specific details of national regulations in two ways: first, the model has empirical content, 
because it is possible to test the prediction of ambiguous results from one legal framework to 
the other using national data on legal reforms affecting dismissals regulations; second, the 
theoretical model can be completed with key national characteristics to analyse specific national 
cases. Both lines of research will potentially increase our current limited knowledge about the 
relationship between firing costs and Labour Law.    26 
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1. The procedural requirements and the severance pay are usually different in individual and 
collective dismissals. We limit ourselves to individual dismissals mainly because collective 
dismissals have been analysed in other researches: Fabel et al. (1999) provide a theoretical 
model of collective dismissals in Germany and Malo (2001) does for the European case as a 
whole. About individual dismissals, up to our knowledge, Malo (2000) is the only existing 
model, but focusing strictly on the Spanish case and with a more restrictive formalization 
(based on Spier, 1992) and with a very different treatment of risk and uncertainty. 
 
2. Since the seminal work by Oi (1962) introduced adjustment costs in the research agenda of 
economists, the literature has focused mainly on their effects on the persistence and duration 
of unemployment, using dynamic labour demand models (Nickell, 1986; Bentolila and 
Bertola, 1990; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1994). The main result of these models is that firing 
costs do not affect average employment along the business cycle but rather than they stabilize 
labour demand generating hysteresis in the employment level and, therefore, in the 
unemployment level (although there could be some effects on average employment depending 
on the nature of the shocks affecting the representative firm). 
 
3. For a detailed description of the evolution of the unfair dismissal legislation in the US, see 
Krueger (1991). 
 
4. On the ACAS see Mumford (1996) and on the MAC offices see Jimeno and Toharia 
(1994). 
 
5. This legal change would include a closed and clear register of fair causes for dismissal, an 
arbitration system to solve disagreements before the trial, a distinction between what causes 
give a right to reinstate and what cases can be terminated imposing a financial compensation 
(a severance pay) and a maximum for employers' financial liabilities (Buechtemann, 1993; 
chap. 1). Our model does not include this variety of aspects. However, considering 
exclusively the freedom of judges to impose a severance pay at will, our model does not 
support such a legal reform.   27 
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